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This paper explores changes in the emotional and affective repertoires mobilized by the 
Northern League, a longstanding and successful radical right-wing populist party in Italy, to 
justify its recent prostitution policy proposal. Having dispensed to a large extent with the 
punitive and fearful rhetoric against migrant prostitution that characterized its previous 
campaigns, under its new leader the Northern League has been calling for the regulation of 
prostitution and for its profitable taxation. A façade of knowing authority on the complex 
issue of prostitution governance is established and asserted by the party leadership and 
citizens are encouraged to think and feel differently about sex workers, now identified as 
profitable human capital. The measures proposed, I suggest, far from being non-moralistic 
and ideologically neutral, as they are presented, reinforce a well-established, emotively 
appealing and normative dichotomy between potentially dangerous individuals in need of 
surveillance and the wholesome family, cornerstone of the nation in need of economic 
assistance to reproduce and thrive. 
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Prostitution evokes strong emotional reactions, and public debates surrounding its 
governance are often emotionally charged to an extent that ‘goes beyond the emotional 
investment that characterizes all public policy’ (Wagenaar and Altink 2012, p. 284). The 
dominant emotions displayed and mobilized within political discussions of the issue include 
pity, sympathy, compassion, anger, fear, disgust, and shame, which are frequently combined 
despite their incongruence (Bjønness 2012; Wagenaar 2018; Wagenaar et al. 2017). Italy 
provides a compelling example of the intensity and persistence of such complexity in the 
country’s ‘never ending debates’ (Danna 2004) on the issue. Since the passing of the 1958 
prostitution law1 numerous proposals have been submitted to Parliament to replace it, and 
alternative approaches to the regulation of prostitution have been discussed in various public 
and political arenas, rarely in a dispassionate manner.   
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With a focus on the Italian context, this paper explores changes in the emotional and 
affective repertoires mobilized by the Northern League, a longstanding and successful radical 
right-wing populist party (Betz 1994) in Italy, to justify the new measures it proposes for the 
economically profitable regulation of prostitution. My interest in these developments emerges 
from an ongoing project on the taxation of prostitution, an aspect that is often overlooked in 
studies on the governance of commercial sex, despite having a notable impact on the 
economic and sexual citizenship of sex workers (Crowhurst 2019). Here, I am particularly 
interested in making sense of the centrality that the Northern League has ascribed to the 
taxation of prostitution in its recent political campaigns and the approach developed to justify 
it. Having dispensed to a large extent with the punitive and fearful rhetoric against migrant 
prostitution characterizing its previous campaigns, the Northern League has more recently 
been calling for the strict regulation of prostitution and its taxation. The new measures 
proposed are presented as commonsensical and non-moralistic, entailing a shift away from 
the fear, disgust, shame and blame that both historically and still today are attached to and 
adopted in political campaigns against prostitution. Citizens are thus encouraged to think and 
feel differently about sex workers, now presented as profitable human capital. Such an 
operation of emotional management is rendered conceivable and tolerable to the public 
through evoking the need for the country to follow in the steps of the most civilized nations, 
and to ensure the wellbeing of the family. The party’s new leader, Matteo Salvini, claims that 
by abandoning ‘moral judgements’ it will be possible to profit from this longstanding 
stigmatized activity and to redirect funds extracted from its taxation to provide free childcare 
and other state support to economically struggling Italian families. A façade of knowing 
authority on the complex issue of prostitution governance is presented, facilitated by ignoring 
the voices of sex workers and their concerns for the negative impact the new policy would 
have on them. The measures proposed, I suggest, far from being rational and ideologically 
neutral, as they are presented, reinforce an emotively appealing and normative dichotomy 
between potentially dangerous sexual practices and individuals in need of surveillance, and 





Analysis of the issues outlined above draws on the expanding inter-disciplinary literature that 
looks at emotions as constitutive of the workings of government and policy (Jupp et al. 2017) 
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and at power and emotions as ‘conceptual twins’ to be treated together (Heaney 2011). In this 
ontological terrain emotions are not considered to be psychological states, but economic, 
social and cultural practices that ‘circulate and are distributed across a social as well as 
psychic field’ (Ahmed 2004, p. 120). It is through their circulation, mobilization and 
representation that emotions assume economic and political value, for example by being put 
to work to rally, influence and govern the emotional states of citizens. Indeed, citizenship 
itself is constructed around ‘the recognition and encouragement of emotions’ (Johnson 2010, 
p. 496), or what is referred to as ‘affective citizenship’ (Jones 2005; Johnson 2010). 
Crucially, instead of assuming that technologies of governance and related constructions of 
citizenship and belonging are shaped around the reasoned expression, deployment and 
management of clearly defined emotions, this body of work looks at how governance 
practices are embedded in and sustained by emotional complexity and incoherence (D’Aoust 
2014). In other words, affective governance is viewed as comprising an assemblage of often 
contrasting emotional strategies, some punitive and fear-invoking, others compassionate and 
aimed at fostering relationships and engagements, and yet others that claim to be practical, 
merely technical and therefore affectively neutral. This complex emotional orchestration 
reflects the multi-layered composition and conflicting interests of political actors and the 
state, itself ‘an assemblage of discourses, practices, projects and technologies, all traversed 
by competing political forces and political projects’ (Newman 2017, p. 23). 
Janet Newman’s (2017) analysis of the competing and loosely linked emotional 
articulations at the heart of contemporary austerity politics in England provides a sharp 
analysis of the ambivalent and unstable use of emotions in governance. Newman identifies 
three interlinked ‘politics’ underpinning austerity measures, each justified and sustained 
through contrasting emotional registers. Firstly, a politics of rationality, driven by technical 
competence and aimed at ensuring the economy’s wellbeing. Hunter (2014) characterises 
approaches similar to this as depoliticized neoliberal governance, a ‘nonpolitics’ where 
unavoidable technical necessity is presented as a way of being reasonable, to promote 
‘universally desirable forms of economic expansion and democratic government around the 
globe’ (Duggan 2003, p. 10 as cited in Hunter 2014, p. 9). To sustain this vision, 
‘governments strive to summon up a public mood of sacrifice, forbearance, patience’ 
(Newman 2017, p. 32). In this way, even what is presented as purely ‘rational’ governance is 
in fact embedded in and entails a set of affective dispositions demanded of citizens. 
Secondly, a politics of responsibility is encouraged which promotes a new moral economy 
whereby individuals are called upon to feel responsible for their wellbeing. In other words, as 
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Pykett et al. (2017, p. 3) put it, emotionalized states and their governments are meant to roll 
back and govern less, ‘renouncing the highly rationalised state bureaucracy in favour of 
personalised forms of self-government’. In this context citizens are called upon to become 
self-reliant entrepreneurial individuals (Berlant 2011) and to direct their affective efforts to 
being focussed, rational and reasonable and thus contributing more effectively and efficiently 
to the greater good. Thirdly, a politics of division and rage emerges which blatantly deploys 
the emotional registers of stigma, blame and shame against those who are identified as 
responsible for weakening the economy and social bonds, in an effort to ‘bind ‘ordinary’, 
hard-working and responsible citizens into a hegemonic ‘we’ – whose feelings of attachment 
are strengthened by fear of the other’ (Newman 2017, p. 31). This analysis of austerity’s 
three-tiered politics reveals that the most obvious emotional deployment, that of rage, is co-
existent with other emotional regimes, albeit being presented as rational and un-emotional. In 
this way a complex picture of affective entanglements, entailing at the same time rationality, 
responsibility and rage, is presented, closely allying with what the Italian case discussed in 
the next sections reveals. 
Finally, putting emphasis on the multi-layered emotional complexity of governance 
and politics is particularly relevant in the analysis of right-wing populist parties such as the 
Italian Northern League. As a growing body of scholarship shows, the rhetoric of populist 
parties uses a highly emotionalized style which relies on anger, blame, fear, anxiety, and 
shame to frame issues at the core of its politics, including immigration, nationalism, identity, 
economic (in)security, and the family (see, for example, Caiani and Della Porta 2011; 
Demertziz 2006; Hameleers et al. 2017; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Rico et al. 2017; Salmela 
and von Scheve 2017; Vasilopulou et al. 2014). But other affective deployments, perhaps less 
ostentatious and also less obviously emotion-driven, should also be taken into account in 
exploring how political actors make sense of and gain support for their, often conflicting, 
political positions and policies. So, while indeed, ‘politicians engage in discourse and rhetoric 
to evoke emotional responses, for an ‘us’ and against an emotionally constructed ‘them’’ 
(Heaney 2013, p. 358), other equally ‘visceral’ affective registers, often disguised in claims 




This paper is based on analysis of two types of documentary sources: official party 
documents published by the Northern League during its lifetime, and messages posted on the 
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Northern League’s (@LegaSalvini) and its current leader Matteo Salvini’s 
(@matteosalvinimi) official Twitter accounts. Party documents include policy briefs and 
proposals issued by the Northern League relating to its approach to prostitution, as well as 
articles and reports on the same topic published in the official party’s newspaper La Padania 
during its circulation between 1997 and 2014. As far as the decision to analyse the two 
aforementioned Twitter accounts is concerned, this needs to be understood in the current 
context which sees social media playing an increasingly important role in the ways politicians 
and their parties communicate. Studies show that in addition to traditional communication 
channels and mainstream media, social media has been used as a particularly powerful tool 
by populist political actors (Bartlett 2014; Bobba 2019; Kriesi 2014). In Italy Matteo Salvini 
has been a catalyst in changing the communication strategy of the Northern League which 
now relies predominantly on social media (Albertazzi et al. 2018; Bobba 2019). He is the 
most active Italian political leader on social media and has one of the highest number of fans 
(Albertazzi et al. 2018), as testified by his over 3.6 million likes on Facebook and more than 
1 million followers on Twitter (as of June 2019). ‘This helps him shape (and, indeed, 
dominate) national debates on issues concerning identity, immigration, and law and order, as 
the controversial remarks made via his SM [social media] accounts are immediately picked 
up by the press and television news’ (Albertazzi et al. 2018, p. 7). Messages posted on 
Matteo Salvini’s and the Northern League’s Twitter and Facebook accounts are identical, and 
when a tweet is shorter than a Facebook post, due to the limited characters allowed by 
Twitter, a link to his Facebook page is added to the message. To avoid the collection of 
duplicate messages this study is based on Twitter posts only. Using Twitter’s advanced 
search tools in the two accounts selected the keywords ‘prostitution’, ‘Merlin’ (the 
‘nickname’ of the current prostitution law, see footnote 1), ‘prostitute’, ‘prostitutes’ and ‘sex 
work’2 returned a total of 207 tweets covering the period since the accounts were opened, 
Matteo Salvini’s in March 2011 and the Northern League’s in February 2008, and until June 
2019. Tweets, relevant linked material included in them (such as videos and articles in the 
press and on digital media), and official party documents were analysed thematically through 
a content analysis of the more and less explicit emotional and affective, visual and verbal 
messages and signifiers identified.  
 
The Northern League’s Shifting Approach to Prostitution 
This section starts with a brief overview of the Northern League and its claims and demands 
over time. It then moves on to look at the approach taken by the party towards the regulation 
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of prostitution until the early 2010s and the adoption of images of danger, invasion and 
threatening proximity underpinning it. Drawing on, but also moving away from these 
affective economies of fear (Ahmed 2004), since 2013 the new party leader’s use of 
prostitution as a political issue reveals a marked rhetorical, affective and emotional shift, 
which is the focus of the analysis in the remaining parts of this article. 
Founded in the 1980s with a strong ethno-regionalist focus, the Northern League is 
considered one of the most successful radical right-wing populist parties in Europe (Bobba 
2019). After gaining electoral capital during Italy’s major political crisis in the 1990s, it 
became the country’s fourth largest party and formed part of various right-wing coalitions 
between 2001 and 2011 (Caneva 2014). Its popularity dwindled in the early 2010s following 
a series of scandals involving its historic leader Umberto Bossi, but after facing an uncertain 
fate it regained strength under Matteo Salvini who took control in 2013. At the general 
elections of 2018 the Northern League performed exceptionally well, gaining over 17 per 
cent of the national vote. In May 2018 it entered a coalition government for the fifth time in 
its history and Matteo Salvini was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the 
Interior (Albertazzi et al. 2018). 
Guided by the anti-elitist and anti-politician rhetoric of its founder, Umberto Bossi, 
and through his ‘direct, simple, simplifying and often offensive’ ‘man of the people’ 
communication style (Fremeaux and Alberatazzi 2002, p. 150), until the late 2000s the 
Northern League advocated for the independence of the northern regions from the corrupt 
centre of political power in Rome and the inefficient South. It also virulently attacked 
immigration, which it presented as a threat to the country’s values and traditions and blamed 
for its socio-economic decline. With a similar ‘no-nonsense’ approach, Matteo Salvini has 
kept anti-immigration at the centre of the party’s ethos, but replaced regionalism with 
nationalism – thus expanding its electorate across the country – and Rome with the EU as the 
people’s enemy (Albertazzi et al. 2018). In line with other radical right-wing populist parties, 
the Northern League’s official discourse has revolved around a commitment to defend the 
‘traditional’ family from a variety of different threats. At different times during the course of 
the past two decades these have included: ‘foreign men’, often portrayed as dangerous 
rapists; the transition towards a multi-racial society, seen as a threat to the purity and 
homogeneity of the nation and the family; same-sex marriage and abortion, considered to be 
against the normative social and natural order; gender ideologies, viewed as dangerously 
destabilizing ‘normal’ sex roles (Akkerman 2015; Avanza 2010; Crowhurst 2012; Lega Nord 
2018; Saitta and Piasecka 2006; Scrinzi 2017) and, until recently, street prostitution. 
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(Migrant) Street Prostitution as a Threat to the Nation and the Family 
 
Since the early 2000s the Northern League’s political programs and manifestos have included 
proposals to reform the 1958 prostitution law which, as seen earlier, remains in place to this 
day despite being inadequate to addressing contemporary developments in commercial sex in 
the country. At the heart of the measures put forward over the years is a simplistic gendered 
and dichotomous understanding of prostitution as exercised by autonomous women in indoor 
premises and by coerced women in outdoor public spaces (Lega Nord 2002a). It is the latter, 
outdoor prostitution, that the party identifies as the most problematic and in need of 
immediate state intervention. The vast majority of those who practice it are migrant women 
whom the Northern League has not shied away from representing with racist and sexist 
stereotypes (Crowhurst 2007; 2012), and accused of: invading public spaces, scandalizing 
children with their scant attire, posing a sanitary risk for ‘the client and his family’, 
threatening ‘love marriage’ with their availability outside the home, and also attracting 
foreign criminals who exploit them and are thus able to accumulate wealth and expand their 
illegitimate businesses across the country (Boiocchi 2002; Lega Nord 2002a, 2002b, 2012;). 
With a view to addressing these multiple threats and to ‘protect public safety, public health 
and to safeguard public morality’ (Lega Nord 2002a, p. 2), in 2002 the Northern League 
submitted to Parliament a law proposal on ‘prostitution, paedophilia, and pornography’. In 
introducing it Umberto Bossi emphatically stated,  
 
An end to the rotten world that has been attacking the family is finally about to come. 
We have now launched a campaign against […] prostitution on the streets, which is 
often seen as alternative to one’s wife outside the house. (Savoini, 20023) 
 
The law proposed to criminalize outdoor prostitution whilst allowing it in specific 
private buildings – referred to as Eros Centres. Thus, as Roberto Calderoli, the then Northern 
League’s National Secretary reportedly stated, ‘if someone has a real need to access it 
[prostitution], they should go to specific areas, far from the normal context of everyday life’ 
(Boiocchi, 2002). In this way, he continued, not only would the practice cause less public 
disturbance, but ‘we would avoid the shocking show that goes on in our streets at any hour of 
the day’ (ibid.). The law proposal also introduced new stringent medical checks for sex 
workers and required their registration with the police. The taxation of prostitution was 
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briefly mentioned in the proposal: ‘fiscal measures are introduced to ensure that prostitution-
related earnings are taxed and that prostitution is assimilated to other professional activities’ 
(Lega Nord 2002a, p.4), although no further explanation was provided about how this would 
be implemented in practice. 
Driving the need for the policy interventions spelled out in this law proposal was first 
and foremost the threat of migrant prostitution, its invasion of Italy’s public places, and its 
attack on the country’s values. Prostitution per se was not condemned, but rather approached 
as ineradicable and thus needing to be regulated to eliminate aspects of it that could not be 
tolerated, i.e. (migrant) street prostitution and the dangers that come with it. The consistent 
use of emotional language and images – threat, menace, invasion, children’s purity under 
attack, slavery-like exploitation, foreign criminal rings – contributed to presenting a picture 
of urgency, of a need to intervene sooner rather than later to prevent a complete loss of 
control over public goods, spaces, and values. With this approach the Northern League 
asserted its power through the historically well-established construction and disciplining of 
dangerous ‘foreign’ bodies (Nagel 2003), claiming that it would protect the country from 
their physical and cultural occupation. However, in a rather contradictory manner, in addition 
to its commitment to get rid of ‘foreign prostitutes’ the law was also presented as having a 
humanitarian intent. The repressive and regulatory turn advocated, it was claimed, would put 
an end to sex trafficking, freeing exploited migrants forced to operate in outdoor prostitution 
(the same accused of invading public spaces), and as a result it would rid the country of the 
foreign criminals whose presence these ‘trafficked victims’ were blamed for (Lega Nord 
2002a). This contemporaneously repressive and, allegedly, humanitarian intervention was 
described in belligerent terms as a battle and a fight that the Northern League had committed 
to embark upon to bring the ‘oldest profession’ under state control, to ‘clean the streets’, to 
put an end to prostitutes’ criminal exploitation and related expansion of foreign criminality, 
and thus ultimately to defend the core of societal stability: the ‘traditional Italian family’.  
Neither the 2002 law proposal nor similar other bills that the Northern League 
supported and submitted in the 2000s ever became law. Nevertheless, prostitution, its 
containment and strict regulation through a law and order framework continued to form part 
of the policy commitments of the party, albeit becoming side-lined in the context of the 
national and economic crises of the decade. The taxation of prostitution remained listed in the 
changes advocated but was never given much attention in the publicity devoted to the issue. 
It was not until Matteo Salvini was elected new leader of the Northern League in 2013 that 
the regulation of prostitution returned as a salient policy issue in the party’s political 
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program, and the benefit of taxing prostitution became dominant in the political campaign 
launched to promote the new initiatives advocated.  
 
Making Economic and Political Capital out of Prostitution 
 
Whilst maintaining continuity with the Northern League’s historical regulationist approach to 
prostitution, Matteo Salvini discarded proposals to create ‘Eros centres’ and geographically 
bounded red-light districts, which, he tweeted, ‘don’t make any sense’, asserting that instead 
‘we must repeal the Merlin Law, regulate and tax prostitution’ (7/2/2015 @matteosalvinimi). 
In the new campaigns spearheaded by Matteo Salvini the Northern League blames the 
anachronistic Merlin Law for having led to the expansion of street prostitution, and maintains 
that its repeal will bring various positive developments to the country: street prostitution and 
the social and spatial degradation that come with it will finally be eradicated as ‘it is not 
possible to allow the trade of Women under the open sky’ (30/05/2017 @matteosalvinimi4); 
there will be a return to the strict control of indoor prostitution; public health will be 
protected; organised crime, trafficking and exploitation will be ‘dealt with’; and order and 
safety will return ‘to our cities’ (Lega Nord 2014a). New fiscal measures put in place to tax 
prostitution will also allow to ‘reduce or eliminate other taxes that burden citizens’ (Lega 
Nord 2014a) and will bring much needed money into the state coffers (28/3/2014; 12/5/2015 
@LegaSalvini).  
What would a repeal of the Merlin Law entail in practice? Some hints are made to the 
re-opening of the so-called closed houses, the infamous state-regulated brothels that the law 
had abolished, but no further specifications on how the proposed changes will be achieved 
are provided, and the typology of organised prostitution that would be put in place remains 
unclear. The lack of details, however, has not stopped the Northern League from promoting 
its proposal. In 2013 Matteo Salvini announced his interest in calling for a referendum to 
repeal the Merlin Law. He tweeted, ‘if the Northern League organised a popular referendum 
to repeal the MERLIN law, to TAX PROSTITUTION, take it away from the streets, regulate 
it, and gain a few billions, would you cast your vote?’ (4/8/2013 @matteosalvinimi). 
Following support for the idea, in 2014 the party’s local offices organized ‘gazebo days’ 
during which the iconic Northern League’s green gazebos were set up in the squares of many 
cities across the country to gather the 500,000 signatures needed to submit the request for a 
referendum.5 This extensively promoted initiative was successful but the signatures collected 
fell short of the quorum. A second round of equally widely publicized signature-collection 
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‘initiatives for the people’, as they were referred to, was organised in 2015. This time enough 
signatures were collected, but after being submitted to the apposite court the request to call 
for a referendum did not move forward to the next approval stages and eventually ended in a 
stalemate. Despite not amounting to any change in policy, the widespread and visible local 
presence of the Northern League’s gazebos and billboards to advertise the collection of 
signatures, coupled with social media publicity and media coverage, contributed to attracting 
political and public attention to the party’s demands pertaining to prostitution, including the 
focus on taxation. 
As Matteo Salvini’s tweet cited above already indicated, since the first campaigns to 
repeal the current prostitution law the Northern League has placed emphasis on two key 
objectives: taxing prostitution and freeing ‘the streets of our cities’. Three tweets are 
reproduced below as examples of the prominence given to both (Figure 1). On the left is a 
tweet posted on the Northern League’s account. The text reads: ‘Matteo Salvini: ‘From 29/3 
[29th March 2014] REFERENDUM to abolish the MERLIN law, regulate and TAX 
prostitution. Are you going to sign?’’ The same message is included in the image below the 
text, which shows a confident and expectant Matteo Salvini, a crossed ‘Yes’, in favour of the 
repeal of the law, and two pictures, one, supposedly of a sex worker soliciting on the street, 
and a second one of Euro banknotes, possibly symbolizing the financial profit that the 
taxation of prostitution would bring to the country (11/3/2014 @LegaSalvini). In the middle 
is a tweet posted on the Northern League’s account calling for people to go and sign for the 
referendum: ‘LET’S TAX PROSTITUTION: from tomorrow. Come and sign’ (28/3/2014 
@LegaSalvini). Below this text is a photograph of one of the billboards displayed during the 
2014 referendum campaigns. With a green background, the traditional colour of the Northern 
League, the billboard’s central message reads ‘Let’s tax prostitution’ and next to it is the 
drawn silhouette of a sex worker soliciting on the streets near a lamppost (28/3/2014 
@LegaSalvini). In the third tweet, on the right, Matteo Salvini writes: ‘REGULATE and 
TAX prostitution as it is done in many other European countries, it’s a fight for 
COMMONSENSE: let’s free our streets and fight human traffickers. More safeguards, more 
health checks and more safety. LESS hypocrisy’. The tweet includes an image of Matteo 
Salvini holding one of the posters used in the 2015 referendum campaign. Next to the 
poster’s message ‘Let’s free our streets and tax prostitution’ is the same drawn silhouette of a 
street sex worker that appears on the billboard (16/1/2016 @matteosalvinimi). What can be 
observed here is that while the call to ‘clean the streets’ has remained just as central as it was 
in the party’s campaign in the 2000s, the prominence given to the taxation of prostitution and 
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its benefits represents a new development – one that Matteo Salvini has energetically 
championed through the mobilization of different emotional and affective registers. 
 
   
Figure 1: Three tweets on the Northern League’s campaigns to repeal the Merlin Law 
 
As discussed earlier, under Umberto Bossi’s leadership the campaign to change the 
Merlin law and introduce a regulationist approach revolved around the threat that ‘foreign 
prostitution’ and its exploiters represented to the Italian nation and family. With the 
involvement of Matteo Salvini the deployment of the threatening and fearful images and 
messages associated with ‘foreign prostitutes’ has shifted. The silhouette used to symbolize 
street sex workers in the Northern League’s most recent campaigns, as seen in figure 1 above, 
can be viewed as symbolic of this change: whilst the Northern League propaganda material 
had previously represented ‘foreign prostitutes’ as grotesquely sexualized and racialized and 
with a menacing and intimidating demeanour (Crowhurst 2012; Barcella 2018), here a 
slender street sex worker is unthreateningly awaiting clients, and by leaning against a 
lamppost she appears to take up little (public) space. The injurious presence which needs to 
be urgently eliminated is no longer that of street sex workers – who will be relocated and thus 
surveyed indoors once the Merlin law is repealed – but rather that of foreign traffickers and 
criminals. In a tweet Matteo Salvini claims that ‘immigrants are responsible for 40% of the 
rapes and for 75% of the crimes linked to prostitution’ (15/2/2016 @matteosalvinimi), and 
similar messages consistently emphasise the ‘foreignness’ of criminals exploiting 
prostitution, be it a ‘gang of Rumanians and Albanians’ (5/5/2017 @LegaSalvini); an ‘Italo-
Rumanian gang’ (19/06/2017 @LegaSalvini), an ‘Albanian gang’ (6/12/2016 
@LegaSalvini); extracommunitarians6 (22/6/2016 @LegaSalvini), the ‘Nigerian Mafia’ 
(25/02/2019 @matteosalvinimi); or ‘foreigners’ and ‘foreign organised crime’ responsible for 
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drug and sex trafficking (15/3/2017 @LegaSalvini and 2/03/2019 @matteosalvinimi). While 
violent criminal foreigners remain a target of the Northern League, in line with its core anti-
immigration ethos, attacking ‘street prostitutes’ with the same vehemence as the 2000s 
campaigns would be incompatible with the new message being conveyed: that prostitution, 
when strictly regulated and taxed, will be good for the country. New emotional and affective 
dispositions are now relayed to and expected of the public: while foreign criminals should 
still be feared and the Northern League relied upon to prioritize the fight against them, the 
abjective emotional responses that have historically been displayed towards prostitution 
should be put to rest. Italian citizens are now invited to trust the party’s leader’s call to recast 
this historically stigmatized activity as an economically valuable resource that needs to be 
taken advantage of, particularly in the context of the country’s ongoing economic crisis7. The 
feelings of fear, disgust, shame, and anger previously evoked towards migrant prostitution are 
now more explicitly directed at its ‘foreign exploiters’, and the family, previously presented a 
victim of prostitution is now its main beneficiary, as further discussed below. 
‘Do we need money?’ (18/11/2014 @matteosalvinimi), ‘Are we short of cash?’ 
(4/10/2012 @matteosalvinimi) asks Matteo Salvini. As this is indeed the case, he tweets, 
Italy should legalize and tax prostitution, following in the footsteps of other European 
countries (18/11/2014; 4/10/2012 @matteosalvinimi). The taxation of prostitution, he 
explains, ‘is advantageous for all: more rights, more safety, more money for the state’ 
(26/5/2015 @matteosalvinimi), although the amount of money that this will bring to the state 
remains unclear, and various tweets report figures progressively decreasing over time: from 
‘billions’ (28/3/2014; 12/5/2015 @LegaSalvini), to four billions (Lega Nord 2013), to three 
billions (14/5/2015 @matteosalvinimi), to two billions (30/5/2017; 18/1/2018 
@matteosalvinimi). Whatever their actual total, it is suggested that these funds, which could 
be collected if the Northern League were in power,8 will not only be beneficial for the nation 
at large, but they could provide much needed economic respite and infrastructural support in 
aid of the financially struggling Italian family. Within this understanding, if regulated 
strategically as envisioned by the Northern League, prostitution will become an invaluable 
resource that can: reduce burdensome taxes that unjustly weigh on most families’ stretched 
finances, guarantee pensions for all, and make it possible to set up free childcare facilities. 
The possibility of investing in the latter is especially emphasized in the Northern League’s 
campaigns to tax prostitution: 
 
 13 
‘Free state nursery schools: they cost 2 billions, I refuse to think that we cannot do it. 
Let’s tax prostitution’ (20/07/2019 @matteosalvinimi); ‘Let’s tax prostitution and we 
can help families with children who go to nursery schools’ (31/5/2016 @LegaSalvini); 
‘Prostitution, let’s tax it and move it away from the streets. With that money we can 
provide children with free nursery schools like in France’ (28/2/2015 
@matteosalvinimi); ‘Free state nursery schools. The costs? They can be covered with 
the taxation of prostitution’ (17/7/2014 @matteosalvinimi); ‘Free nursery schools 
across Italy: they would cost 2 billions, if we tax prostitution the state would gain 3 
billions, what do you say?’ (27/4/2014 @matteosalvinimi). 
 
 In other messages the revenues collected through the taxation of prostitution are 
presented as part of the solution to the country’s low natality rate:  
 
‘Europeans must get back to making BABIES, let’s help them with free NURSERY 
SCHOOLS. The money can be taken from the taxation of prostitution’ (29/3/2017 
@matteosalvinimi); and ‘Birth rate in Italy is at its lowest. We should tax sex workers 
and use the revenues to fund subsidies for families’ (4/2/2017 @matteosalvinimi, 
original message in English9). 
 
 To enable these measures in favour of the family, it is claimed, it is necessary to 
recognize the very existence of the phenomenon of prostitution and to move beyond the 
moralisms that have created a stalemate in its governance – ‘there is no point in pretending 
that prostitution does not exist’ (16/4/2015 @matteosalvinimi); ‘I don’t give moral 
judgements, but prostitution exists and needs to be regulated, taking it off the streets’ 
(18/1/2015 @matteosalvinimi). It is also stated that this approach is in the interest of sex 
workers themselves who will be ‘better protected, safe and clean’ (5/5/2015 
@matteosalvinimi). ‘We want prostitutes to be subjected to medical checks and that they 
carry out their profession far from the streets, in safe areas, restricted by law. The repeal of 
the Merlin Law would mean more safety and more guarantees for those who carry out this 
activity’ (Lega Nord 2014b). The management of prostitution to give ‘safety and health 
guarantees to prostitutes and clients’ (16/4/2015 @matteosalvinimi) is presented as a ‘fight 
for civilization’ (15/6/2015 @matteosalvinimi), one that ‘other civilized countries’ have 
already fought and won (5/5/2015; 15/1/2018 @matteosalvinimi). Not to follow in their 
footsteps is viewed as a display of the incompetence and hypocrisy of the government, of 
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other parties and of political leaders who are blamed for making hollow promises, all 
resulting in inaction: 
 
‘Renzi [the then premier of the country] should commit to taxing prostitution, 
otherwise his are all empty words’ (24/3/2014 @matteosalvinimi); ‘Banning 
prostitution? A great hypocrisy. I am for its regulation and taxation, and its full 
legalisation’ (4/2/2016 @matteosalvinimi); ‘A state that makes money out of slot 
machines, alcohol and tobacco but does not accept prostitution is hypocritical’ 
(16/4/2015 @matteosalvinimi).  
 
 With a view to signalling a rupture with the government of the time, Matteo Salvini’s 
rhetoric appears to be challenging the historical and ‘hypocritical’ association of prostitution 
with deviance, crime, immorality, social threat, and violence (Scoular 2015) which had also 
been an explicit part of his party’s previous campaigns. In contrast to it and unlike his 
political opponents, he promises a ‘battle for commonsense’ (16/01/2018 @matteosalvinimi) 
and an enlightened vision that moves beyond burdensome morals, offering guarantees to sex 
workers, and ultimately contributing to the common good. However, as I further elaborate in 
the following section, while it is presented as a judgement-free matter of technical 
competence to ‘balance the books’, the message underpinning the Northern League’s position 
on prostitution evokes and reinforces well-established divisions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
ways of being a (sexual) citizen that can hardly be viewed as enhancing, as it is claimed, sex 
workers’ rights and working conditions. 
 
Shifting Affective Registers and Enduring (Sexual) Norms 
 
In the 2000s the Northern League did not deny or ignore that prostitution is an economic 
activity, indeed the taxation of prostitution was part of the party’s political program from the 
beginning. Nevertheless, affective and emotional conventions of sexuality such as sexual 
shame, stigma, disgust (Irvine 2008) and a racialized politics of fear targeting unwanted and 
allegedly sexually dangerous migrants were deployed more prominently in conjunction with 
prostitution policy proposals in order to strengthen the party’s image as the defender of the 
nation and of ‘traditional’ values, both under attack. In the 2010s the change in the party’s 
leadership entailed a switch in the emotional regime employed to muster support for the 
party’s position on the matter. With Matteo Salvini, the party makes an emphatic claim for 
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the recognition of regulated indoor prostitution as part of the formal economy and promises 
that the nation will benefit greatly from the earmarking of prostitution-related taxation 
revenues for much needed public expenditures. This approach is presented, using Hunter’s 
(2014) words previously cited, as an ‘unavoidable technical necessity’ that entails a ‘no-
nonsense’ view of prostitution as a phenomenon that needs technical and concrete solutions. 
The affective register displayed by the party leader is no longer one of anger and 
aggressiveness, as had been the case with Umberto Bossi, but rather of control and 
rationality. Citizens are encouraged to trust these attributes and the party leader’s vision and 
to abandon the historically-ingrained affective and emotional approaches that had cast 
prostitution exclusively as disgusting and fearful. This is a lot to ask. In order to summon up 
support for this new political approach, the trope of the threatening foreigner is not 
relinquished, although no longer central in the party’s rhetoric. According to it, the streets 
still ‘need to be cleaned’, however the matter out place (Douglas 1966) to get rid of are no 
longer ‘foreign prostitutes’ but foreign criminals and gangs who exploit them. But it is 
another well-trodden emotional trope that gains prominence in the new campaign: the family, 
its wellbeing and survival. 
The appeal to ‘family feelings’ is commonly used by politicians (Johnson 2010) and, 
as seen earlier, the protection of the family had been central in the previous Northern League 
campaign against outdoor prostitution. Matteo Salvini, however, shifts the relationship 
between prostitution and the family that had characterised previous campaigns. Now sex 
workers are presented as human capital, an untapped financial resource which is going to 
help the Italian family. To encourage citizens to detach themselves from anti-prostitution 
sentiments and to think more strategically and long-term about the issue, the wellbeing and 
future of the family and children serve to mobilize feelings of care and protection. Evoking 
anxieties and insecurities spurred by the economic crisis, the deficit and lack of public 
spending serves to reinforce support for the Northern League’s rhetoric and citizens are asked 
to act and think responsibly about what is best for the country. Although not explicitly 
presented as such, a choice is put forth in the Northern League’s campaigns: what is more 
important? Moralistic and ideological approaches to prostitution and visceral opposition to it 
that will bring no change, or, more practical, instrumental measures that will help the family? 
Choosing the former is portrayed as a betrayal of the country’s interests, and a hypocritical 
position which is what current governmental leaders and politicians with a lack of vision and 
ambition continue to pursue. Choosing the latter will not only guarantee better futures to 
families and children, but it will also bring the country to a new level of civilization. Here the 
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affective attachment of national pride is also mobilized with the promise of raising Italy to 
the level of other model countries. Like France, Italy will be able to provide free nursery 
schools to children, and similarly to what other ‘civilized counties’ have already done, 
regulating and taxing prostitution will bring multiple benefits to all, including sex workers.  
Indeed, the new measures are presented as generous concessions to sex workers who 
will no longer be criminalized and whom good citizens are asked to tolerate in order to 
guarantee a better future to the country and enhance its reputation and exemplary role. By 
recognizing prostitution as a legitimate economic activity, and by being allowed to pay taxes, 
it is claimed that sex workers will learn the responsibilities that are already taken up by all 
other law-abiding citizens. They will enjoy taxpayer citizenship (Walsh 2018), they will be 
allowed to operate in enclosed, strictly policed and safe spaces, and will be subjected to 
regular medical checks. This will result, as Matteo Salvini tweeted, in having cleaner and 
safer sex workers with more guarantees.  
Tolerance, however, as Brown (2006) posits, is not a practice of inclusion, but rather 
a posture of indulgence that enhances and sustains the ‘Other’s’ abjection whilst reinforcing 
the superiority of, in this case, the magnanimous leader and the good, tolerating citizens. The 
emotionally powerful juxtaposition upon which the message of the Northern League and of 
its leader is based is value-laden and reinforces enduring hierarchies of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
citizens. On one hand we have families, the ‘good’ citizens who are unjustly struggling 
because of economic strains and political ineptitude and who need to be put in the conditions 
to procreate and thrive. On the other hand, at the outer limit of the ‘charmed circle’ (Rubin 
1984) of ‘good’ citizens are sex workers who are now given a chance to contribute to the 
nation’s wellbeing by providing the means to support ailing families. The conditions for this 
to take place is that the state takes full control of their bodies and sexual health, and that they 
are kept spatially circumscribed and policed. What is described as a progressive and civilized 
set of measures will give sex workers the right to pay taxes, the ‘more rights’ alluded to by 
Matteo Salvini, and it will also entail a return to the pre-Merlin Law regulationist system that 
took many years to get rid of. This forced sex workers to comply with regulations – such as 
registering with the police, undergoing biweekly vaginal checks, working in strictly surveyed 
state-brothels – that soon made them subject to a series of abuses, including police 
harassment, overcharging by doctors, difficulty in obtaining documents for marriage 
purposes, and being tarnished publicly as unrespectable, diseased and disordered (Gibson 
1999).  
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It is not the scope of this paper to evaluate the specificities of the proposal set forth by 
the Northern League nevertheless, it is worth noting that sex workers were never consulted in 
its development. Prostitution policy design should entail a thorough analysis of the complex 
phenomenon it aims to address in collaboration and consultation with experts in the field, 
including those who operate in the sex industry. Instead, it is often reduced to dogmatic 
claims and simplistic solutions that have electoral appeal but end up being impractical and 
often result in unforeseen and problematic effects (Wagenaar and Altink 2012). Unknowns, 
ambivalences and complexities – of which there are many in the sex industry – are viewed as 
political hindrances that should best be avoided. The more undoubting and assertive the 
authority with which prostitution policy measures are presented, partial or unrealistic as they 
may be, the stronger is the affective confidence and sense of power and control that the 
‘knowers’ convey (Crowhurst 2017). Like his predecessor, Matteo Salvini has never shown 
any doubt over the best way for the country to manage prostitution. Through his display of 
confidence, ownership of the issue and a sense of control, and by ignoring the voices of sex 
workers and the multi-layered complexity of the sex industry he has been able to justify the 
shift in affective and emotional dispositions demanded of the electorate with a plan that he 




This paper presented an example of the role of affects and emotions in making sense of 
prostitution and its governance. The focus on the Italian Northern League revealed a shift in 
the affective and emotional regimes relayed to and demanded of the population toward the 
phenomenon. This case, in line with the literature of emotional politics reviewed earlier, has 
shown the complex coexistence of multiple, contradictory emotions used to influence 
citizens’ feelings. Similarly to what Newman (2017) had identified in her study, the Italian 
case emphasizes a turn to what is presented as technical and rational politics. However, far 
from it, multiple affective and emotional registers have been deployed to sustain it: from the 
ever-present fear of dangerous foreigners, to the need for citizens to take responsibility for 
the future of the nation, to feel differently about sex workers and to learn to tolerate the 
‘Other’ within, to the promise of supposedly including sex workers and responsibilize them 
into serving for the country. Coupled with these affective and emotional mobilizations is 
Matteo Salvini’s display of knowing authority, easily conveyed through social media, which 
enables to ignore the complexity of the phenomenon at hand and the voices of those whom he 
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claims to want to provide with more rights. The vision of the future that is ‘passed’ as 
enlightened and progressive, however, is not too dissimilar from a Handmaid’s Tail (Atwood 
1986) scenario, where sex workers are kept in surveyed and strictly policed spaces, with their 
bodies regularly checked and inspected by others, in order to carry out their activity to save 
the nation and the family. 
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